Nuremberg Research Seminar in Economics on 10 January 2024 – LG 0.423
You are invited to join the weekly Nuremberg Research Seminar in Economics on 10 January 2024, from 13.15 to 14.45 pm. The seminar will be held in room LG 0.423. Marcos Yamada Nakaguma (University of Sao Paulo) will be talking about „Electoral Campaign Attacks: Theory and Evidence”.
More information can be found here:
This paper studies the determinants of electoral campaign attacks. We first propose a model to examine the main factors that influence candidates’ decisions to attack. Our theoretical analysis yields a number of predictions which we test using information from “right of reply” lawsuits filed in Brazil. Our empirical analysis exploits a regression discontinuity design based on virtual ties between 2nd and 3rd place candidates to show that candidates with an electoral advantage are more likely to receive an attack. We then exploit another discontinuity to show that the patterns of campaign attacks differ significantly under single and dual ballot plurality.